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Abstract 
The home states of multinational enterprises have in recent years sought to use public 
regulation to fill the gaps left by the absence of a binding labor standards framework in 
international law. This article examines recent home state initiatives to address forced labor, 
human trafficking, and slavery in global supply chains, and their interactions with private 
governance initiatives. Focusing on a case study of the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act and 
2010 UK Bribery Act, we analyse two distinct legislative approaches that policymakers have 
used to promote corporate accountability within global supply chains and explore the varied 
impacts that these approaches have on corporate behaviour. Empirically, we analyse codes of 
conduct, annual CSR reports, and supplier terms and conditions for 25 FTSE 100 companies 
to shed light into the impact of the legislation on corporate behaviour.  We find that 
legislation that creates criminal corporate liability appears to spur deeper changes to corporate 
strategy, and argue that in the case of the Modern Slavery Act, the triumph of voluntary 
reporting over more stringent public labor standards seems to have undermined the 
effectiveness of recent governance initiatives to address forced labor in global supply chains.  
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1. Introduction  
After more than two decades of private governance initiatives to promote Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), reports of gross human rights violations within global supply chains 
remain in the public spotlight. Recent examples include the Rana Plaza building collapse in 
Bangladesh, the Tazreen factory fire in Pakistan, oil spills on Ogoniland in Nigeria, and 
forced labor in VHYHUDOFRXQWULHVDQGLQGXVWULHVUDQJLQJIURP7KDLODQG¶VILVKLQJERDWVWR:HVW
African cocoa farms. In light of recurrent reports of labor exploitation and ZRUNHUV¶premature 
death within supply chains, consumers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others 
have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the industry-led private governance regimes, 
through which companies purport to address and prevent these types of violations. Recently, 
societal coalitions in countries like the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), France, 
and India have succeeded in sparking a wave of new public governance designed to 
strengthen corporate accountability. This has included legislation passed by the home states of 
multinational enterprises² in other words, the countries in which the large retail and brand 
manufacturing companies that lead global supply chains are incorporated² which is 
primarily geared towards changing corporate practices in host states, the countries in which 
multinational enterprises operate, either directly or through subsidiaries. Examples of recent 
µhome state regulation¶ WR VSXU PXOWLQDWLRQDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ IRU WKHLU JOREDO VXSSO\ FKDLQV
include the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, the US Dodd-Frank Act (which 
regulates conflict minerals), the UK Bribery Act (which establishes extraterritorial corporate 
criminal liability for bribery in global supply chains), and the UK Modern Slavery Act (which 
includes a transparency in supply chains clause).  To date, the effectiveness of this wave of 
legislation and the questions of how, whether, and when it impacts corporate behaviour has 
been under investigated.  
In this paper, we explore the accelerating legislative trend of home state legislation¶V
use to mandate CSR and stimulate changes in corporate behaviour and its consequences for 
the governance of labor standards in global supply chains. In particular, we investigate how 
the stringency and institutional design of national legislation shapes private governance 
responses and evaluate the effectiveness of different models of home state regulation. 
Conceptually, we seek to build on and deepen recent scholarship on CSR policy (Steurer, 
2010; Gond, Kang and Moon, 2011) and the governance of labor standards in global supply 
chains (Phillips and Mieres 2014; Appelbaum and Lichtenstein, 2016; Phillips, LeBaron and 
Wallin, 2016) by exploring public-private interactions in recent CSR-labor standard 
government instruments and their implications for corporate strategy. Our conceptual 
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contribution is two-fold. First, we argue that there is a need for more nuanced understanding 
of variation amongst CSR-focused government interventions and that existing typologies and 
frameworks need to be adjusted to reflect this variation. We introduce a continuum to capture 
the different forms of public and private governance interactions at play in recent home state 
regulations, which may be helpful in guiding future research on the impact and effectiveness 
of home state legislation. Second, we challenge prevailing assumptions about the 
complementarity of public and private governance. We argue that because hybrid forms of 
global supply chain governance vary significantly in their quality and stringency to the extent 
that some home state legislation merely endorses existing voluntary CSR reporting without 
strengthening legally binding standards, they may not be as effective as is anticipated by the 
literature.  
Empirically, our analysis focuses on an in-depth comparison of two CSR-focused 
government interventions in the UK²the Bribery Act 2010 and the UK Modern Slavery Act 
2015² centred on the legislaWLRQ¶V institutional design, stringency, and legal implications for 
companies. While both pieces of legislation seek to use national regulation to deepen 
corporate accountability within global supply chains, they do so in two different ways. The 
Bribery Act is a stringent form of home state regulation that establishes extraterritorial 
corporate criminal liability and includes binding public standards and sanctions for non-
compliance. The Modern Slavery Act is a less stringent form of regulation that increases 
FRPSDQLHV¶ REOLJDWLRQV ZLWK UHJDUGV WR GLVFORVXUH DQG UHSRUWLQJ RQ YROXQWDU\ HIIRUWV WR
address and prevent forced labor in global supply chains; it does not establish extraterritorial 
liability, and includes no binding public standards or sanctions for non-compliance. Motivated 
by questions about whether and how variations in home state regulation give rise to 
differentiated outcomes in corporate strategy, we explore the impacts of these two pieces of 
legislation on twenty-five FTSE 100 companies. We analyse how company purchasing 
practices, supplier policies, and reporting relating to bribery and forced labor evolved in the 
wake of the Acts. We then zoom in on a case study of Vodafone¶VEULEHU\DQGIRUFHGODERr 
policies to explore the impact of these interventions at the level of a single company.  
We find that the Bribery Act appears to have resulted in significant changes to 
corporate policy and practices regarding bribery, and that companies have communicated 
these higher standards to their suppliers. However, we find that the Modern Slavery Act does 
not DSSHDU WR KDYH \LHOGHG VXEVWDQWLYH FKDQJH LQ PXOWLQDWLRQDO HQWHUSULVHV¶ SROLF\ DQG
practices regarding labor standards in their global supply chains. This pattern is important 
because it suggests that the public and private interactions at play in home state legislation 
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matter and vary, and that some forms of legislation are more likely to be effective than others. 
Furthermore, our findings raise a concern that the integration and legitimation of private 
governance initiatives within legislation may not always produce positive synergies and 
optimized form of hybrid governance as anticipated by strands of the literature. In the case of 
the Modern Slavery Act, the substitution of a private governance mechanism for public 
regulations that would have established corporate liability for forced labor in global supply 
chains appears to have weakened the quality and effectiveness of this legislation.  
Our research is desk-based and focused on the institutional design of governance 
initiatives and how these influence corporate policies.  It should be understood as an initial 
µSODXVLELOLW\SUREH¶of our intuition that different models of home state legislation will achieve 
different levels of success in µVWHHUing¶ FRUSRUDWH EHKDYLRXU and raising standards in global 
supply chains :H DUH QRW HQGHDYRXULQJ LQ WKLV SDSHU WR µSURYH¶ WKLV LQWXLWLRQ RU WR
comprehensively document such trends. Given the relatively small number of companies 
included in our study, and given that corporate policies can differ from actual practices, much 
more in-depth, comparative, and field-based research will be required to explore and confirm 
our findings. In particular, as we describe in the Conclusion, future qualitative and 
quantitative research could usefully shed light into whether corporate policies have indeed 
evolved as we suggest, and whether these changes are attributable to these Acts or some other 
form of influence.i  Our primary aim in this paper is to highlight the variation that exists in 
national policy HQDFWHG WR µVWHHU¶ &65 and to provide an early exploration of one set of 
possible consequences of these variations. 
The issue of whether and to what extent the institutional design and quality of home 
state regulation influences private regulatory behaviour is deserving of future research not 
only because it will deepen and advance scholarship on public and private governance 
interactions, but also because it carries important consequences for policymaking. As 
governments around the world increasingly seek to protect labor standards and address 
worker exploitation by mandating CSR, they are considering a range of legislative 
approaches, some of which are strictly public and others are hybrid (combining elements of 
public and private governance).  As they seek to create new public regulation to mandate CSR 
and raise labor standards, government and civil society actors should consider whether the 
substitution of private governance alternatives over public standards weakens and reduces the 
impact of home state legislation.    
The paper unfolds in five parts. Section 2 positions our study and research questions 
within the literature on CSR policy and the governance of labor standards. Section 3 examines 
5 
 
the legal gaps surrounding labor standards in global supply chains and the barriers they pose 
for their effective governance and it analyses two legislative approaches to promoting CSR in 
global supply chains, FRQWUDVWLQJWKH8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKWRWDFNOLQJLOOHJDOILQDQFLDO 
practices through the Bribery Act and illegal labor practices through the Modern Slavery Act. 
In Section 4, we explore the differential effects of these Acts on corporate policies.  Section 5 
concludes, arguing that the institutional design of the Modern Slavery Act is an example of 
the dangers and limited effectiveness of a new model of legislation that seeks to change 
corporate practice without raising public standards or strengthening compliance measures.  
 
 
2. Variation in home state regulation to spur CSR for labor standards 
Today, both public DQG µprivate¶ regulations govern labor standards in global supply chains 
(Fransen and Burgoon, this volume; see also: Locke, 2013; Phillips and Mieres, 2014).  Home 
state legislation seeks to harmonize and combine elements of both public and private 
governance and to use national legislation to strengthen and steer company µVHOI-UHJXODWLRQ¶
(Vogel, 2010). In recent years, policymakers have used various models of home state 
regulation in an effort to stimulate higher labor standards within global supply chains.   
Responding to pressure from advocacy groups, investors, and some factions of 
industry calling for greater corporate accountability² especially around the use of illegal 
labor practices like forced labor, human trafficking, and modern slavery within global supply 
chains (LeBaron 2014)² governments including the US, UK, France, and India have passed 
legislation with the stated purpose of spurring multinational enterprises to increase 
accountability for abusive labor practices used by their suppliers. As UK Prime Minister 
7KHUHVD0D\GHVFULEHGWKHUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGWKHFRXQWU\¶V0RGHUQ Slavery Act (which 
VKH KHOSHG WR SDVV LQ KHU SUHYLRXV FDSDFLW\ DV +RPH 6HFUHWDU\ ³5DWKHU WKDQ FKDVLQJ
individual criminals in Britain as they are reported, we need a radically new, comprehensive 
approach to defeating this vile and systematic international business model at its source and in 
WUDQVLW´0D\ In the UK and elsewhere, policymakers have described how home state 
regulation can help to raise the ethical standards associated with goods produced abroad but 
consumed within their borders.  
Home state legislation is grounded in assumptions about the complementarity of 
public and private governance. Although the pressure on governments to pass these initiatives 
has largely stemmed from consumers and societal groups concerned that existing private 
governance schemes are ineffective, most home state legislation is designed to strengthen and 
6 
 
steer CSR rather than replace it. In particular, home state legislation is premised upon the 
notion that legislation can spur multinational enterprises to use their µLPEDODQFH LQ
commercial power¶ WR SUHVVXUH RYHUVHDV VXSSOLHUV WR FKDQJH WKHLU SUDFWLFHV DQG WKDW such 
changes²including improvements to labor standards²  can be achieved through private 
governance mechanisms (Barrientos, 2008).  While all home state regulation seeks to use 
national law to steer CSR, home state regulations have been enacted through a range of 
different institutional designs that combine elements and instruments of public and private 
governance. 
Home state regulation varies in terms of the size and type of companies it covers, the 
duties imposed on those companies, its reach of application within supply chains, 
enforcement mechanisms, and penalties for non-compliance. Variations in home state 
regulation means that legislative models differ in terms of their quality and stringency, 
particularly concerning whether or not the legislation imposes new standards, the 
comprehensiveness of those standards, and the ways in which the standards are enforced. It 
also differs in terms of the role allocated to the state and companies in determining, enacting, 
and enforcing those standards within global supply chains.  In Table 1, we summarize the key 
differences between four recent models of home state regulation: transparency legislation, 
µFRPSO\ RU H[SODLQ¶ VW\OH UHSRUWLQJ GXH GLOLJHQFH UHSRUWLQJ DQG GXH GLOLJHQFH OLDELOLWLHV
These different models of home state regulation exist on a continuum, wherein the 
WUDQVSDUHQF\ PRGHO LV WKH OHDVW VWULQJHQW WKH µVRIWHVW¶ IRUP RI ODZ DQG WKH GXH GLOLJHQFH
lLDELOLWLHVPRGHOLVWKHPRVWVWULQJHQWWKHµKDUGHVW¶IRUPRIODZ 
 
Table 1 goes here 
 
Perhaps because this body of legislation is so new, variations in home state regulation 
have not been fully explored within the literatures on the links between CSR and public policy 
(Steurer 2010) and transnational business governance interactions and orchestration (Eberlein 
et al, 2010; Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 2010).  Of late, there has been increased attention to the 
use of national legislation to spur CSR (Gond, Kang, and Moon, 2011) and an emphasis on 
the positive SRWHQWLDO IRU VWDWHV WR µGLUHFW¶ SULYDWH UHJXODWRU\ VWandards (Abbott and Snidal, 
2010). However, much of the exploration of whether, how, and under what circumstances 
such efforts are successful has focused on differences in the quality of private governance 
instruments and regimes, ranging from the stringency of private standards to the distribution 
of power between companies and NGOs.  Much less attention has been paid to the differences 
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in the quality of public governance instruments developed to strengthen and steer private 
regulation. Indeed, public legislation appears within the literature to be relatively 
KRPRJHQRXVDQGLVIUHTXHQWO\DVVXPHGWREHµKDUGHU¶and more binding than it is in practice. 
As our analysis of home state legislation makes clear, some recent public legislation (such as 
the UK Modern Slavery Act) is fully dependent on private governance tools, standards, and 
enforcemeQWPHFKDQLVPVWRPHHWLWVDLPVDQGLQVSLWHRIWKHIDFWWKDWLWLVµSXEOLF¶UHJXODWLRQ
to strengthen corporate accountability, it does not actually impose or enforce new public 
standards. This body of legislation WKXVEOXUVWKHELQDU\IUHTXHQWO\SRVLWHGEHWZHHQµKDUG¶DQG
µVRIW¶ODZLQWKHJRYHUQDQFHRIODERr standards.  
For this reason, home state legislation does not sit easily within existing 
conceptualizations of the links between public policy and CSR. 6WHXUHU¶V W\SRORJ\RI
public policies on CSR in Europe, for instance, claims that governmental CSR initiatives can 
be characterized by three elements: first, µWKH JRYHUQDQFH SULQciples of voluntariness and 
FROODERUDWLRQ¶ VHFRQG WKDW SROLF\ LQVWUXPHQWV DUH µVRIW ±ODZ¶ LQ FKDUDFWHU and third, that 
µWKH\DOOVKDUHWKHSXUSRVHRIIRVWHULQJ&65DQGVXVWDLQDEOHGHYHORSPHQWFRPSOHPHQWDULO\WR
traditional hard-ODZ UHJXODWLRQV¶ Steurer 2010: 51; Steurer 2012: 734).  However, within 
home state regulation, it is increasingly impossible to disentangle hard and soft law, and even 
more difficult to separate FRPSDQLHV¶ µYROXQWDU\¶ &65 IURP their legally mandated CSR. 
Because the conceptual diVWLQFWLRQV WKDW 6WHXUHU GUDZV EHWZHHQ µKDUG¶ DQG µVRIW¶ ODZ DQG
µYROXQWDU\ &65¶ DQG µFRUSRUDWH DFFRXQWDELOLW\¶ GR QRW DOLJQ ZLWK UHDOLWLHV RI KRPH VWDWH
legislation, this body of public policy instruments cannot be integrated into his typology.   
As noted above, home state legislation varies, from softer forms of transparency 
UHJXODWLRQ HJ LQ WKH 8.¶V 0RGHUQ 6ODYHU\ $FW WR PRUH ELQGLQJ GLVFORVXUH UHTXLUHPHQWV
(e.g. the US Dodd-Frank section on conflict minerals), to legal liability for violations of CSR 
principles if companies fail to have due diligence mechanisms in place (e.g. the French devoir 
de vigilance which requires companies to adopt and publish a due diligence plan). Through 
such legislation the legal dimension of CSR has gradually further developed. Partly in 
recognition of this growing legal dimension of CSR, the European Commission adopted a 
QHZGHILQLWLRQRI&65LQDVµWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIHQWHUSULVHVIRUWKHLULPSDFWRQVRFLHW\¶
(European Commission, 2011) which²importantly² no longer states that CSR is 
µYROXQWDU\¶ Recent home state legislation thus provides important insights into the rapidly 
shifting reconfigurations between law and CSR, including that law can now require directors 
to take CSR issues into account (such as in section 172 of the UK Companies Act), it can 
require reporting, and it can give legal force to soft CSR standards through contract law or 
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competition law. To date, these reconfigurations, and their implications for company 
behaviour, have received too little attention within the literature. 
Home state regulation also highlights the need for a more detailed analysis of public 
regulation amongst scholars of orchestration and transnational business government 
interactions. Within the orchestration literature (cf. Abbott and Snidal, 2009, 2010), scholars 
have tended to assume that the integration and legitimation of private governance initiatives 
within legislation produces positive synergies and optimized form of hybrid governance.  
However, our analysis of variation within home state regulation suggests that public-private 
interactions may be more or less productive, depending on interactions within the different 
categories outlined in Table 1. As we document, in models of home state regulation that 
codify and legitimize existing private governance standards and compliance mechanisms, new 
legislation does not produce strengthened public standards or compliance measures for labor 
governance. Nor does it necessarily strengthen private standards or compliance measures, 
since companies could be compliant with the new laws merely by reporting that they are 
doing nothing to address the problems of labor abuse, or continuing existing private initiatives 
in spite of their well-documented shortcomings. There is thus considerable cause for 
scepticism about the effectiveness of various models of regulation in spurring changes in 
corporate practice and behaviour.  
The emergence and acceleration of home state legislation raises a flurry of questions 
for scholars interested in public and private labor governance interactions. Given that much of 
WKLV OHJLVODWLRQ LV µK\EULGL]HG¶ IRU LQVWDQFH LQFRUSRUDWLQJ SULYDWH VWDQGDUGV OLNH FRGHV RI
conduct, and private monitoring strategies like auditing) when, why, and how does the 
integration of private governance instruments and standards within national regulation lead to 
stronger and more effective legislation? Which models of home state regulation are most 
effective in strengthening corporate policies and practices? As mentioned in the Introduction, 
extensive empirical research will be required to answer these questions, both to evaluate the 
effectiveness of different models of home state legislation and to understand their role within 
the global governance of labor standards² tasks that exceed the scope and limitations of our 
paper.   As an early exploration of such questions, in the remaining sections we describe the 
gaps in legal governance surrounding labor standards in global supply chains that home state 
legislation has been implemented to address, and we investigate the impact of two recent 
pieces of UK home state legislation on twenty-five multinational enterprises incorporated 
within the UK. As described in our research approach (Section 4.1), our focus is on evaluating 
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the institutional design and stringency of each initiative and its effectiveness in steering 
corporate behaviour across the two issue areas (illegal financial and labor practices).  
 
3. Two legislative models to mandate CSR: corporate criminal liability and 
transparency regulation  
3.1.  Regulatory gaps surrounding labor standards in global supply chains 
Recent efforts to use home state legislation to prompt corporate accountability are rooted in 
the recognition of the µUHJXODWRU\ JDS¶ surrounding global supply chains (Fransen and 
Burgoon, 2012, pp. 236-239; Fransen and Burgoon, this volume). To date, legal loopholes 
have enabled multinational enterprises to avoid liability for labor abuse and human rights 
violations enacted by the suppliers who make the goods they sell to consumers.  Before 
examining in-depth two models of home state regulation enacted in response to these gaps, it 
is worth briefly outlining their key dimensions. Four elements are especially important. 
 First, there is no comprehensive binding international framework in place that 
addresses the conduct of companies in global supply chains, and companies are not 
considered to be duty bearers in public international law (de Jonge, 2011). Although in recent 
\HDUV WKHUHKDVEHHQDSUROLIHUDWLRQRI&65VWDQGDUGVDQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO µVRIW ODZV¶VXFKDV
through the UN Global Compact which has been widely adopted by multinational enterprises, 
these initiatives cannot substitute for a global µUHJXODWRU\ LQVWUXPHQW¶ because they are not 
enforceable.  
 Second, as has been widely documented in the literature, there are regulatory and 
enforcement gaps surrounding labor standards across many host states, creating regulatory 
contexts in which labor exploitation and abuses can occur (Baughen, 2015). This has given 
rise to widespread labor exploitation across several industries, as well as business models 
deliberately configured around forced labor and human trafficking (Allain et al, 2013; 
Phillips, 2013).  
Third, the legal structure of global supply chains makes it difficult to hold 
multinational enterprises liable for violations that occur. Although sourcing strategies differ 
across multinational enterprises, most operate through foreign directly-owned subsidiary 
companies and suppliers as contractual partners (Mosley, 2011). In English law, parent 
companies are not vicariously liable for the conduct of their subsidiary companies (see Adams 
v Cape Industries plc [1990] BCLC 479, 513). It is therefore very difficult to hold 
multinational enterprises responsible for illegal acts (torts) committed by overseas 
subsidiaries apart from the rare situation where a parent company is held to owe a duty of care 
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to the employees of their subsidiary.ii The situation is even more problematic with suppliers. 
As completely independent companies they are legally liable for their own employees and 
standards (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). 
 Fourth, and relatedly, the territoriality principle within the rules of private 
international law PHDQV WKDW LW LVRIWHQGHWHUPLQHG WKDWKRVW VWDWHV¶ laws are applicable (not 
home states) and that host state courts are competent to hear YLFWLPV¶ claims (McClean and  
Ruiz, 2012). 
 
3.2. The model of the Bribery Act and the Modern Slavery Act 
The UK has been at the forefront of introducing legislation designed to strengthen CSR, 
passing two major pieces of home state legislation since 2010: the Bribery Act and the 
Modern Slavery Act. As described in the Introduction, through this legislation, the UK 
government has sought to close regulatory gaps described above by mandating that companies 
of a certain size or operating within a certain sector take responsibility for standards in their 
global supply chains. In other words, through home state legislation, policymakers have 
challenged the notion that companies can outsource liability for illegal and widely condemned 
practices² such as bribery or the use of forced labor² to their suppliers. We have focused 
RXUFDVHVWXG\DURXQGWKH8.¶V Modern Slavery Act 2015 and Bribery Act 2010 because, as 
described in Table 1, they represent examples of the least and most stringent models of home 
state legislation. This section of the paper describes the key differences between these models 
of home state regulation²transparency and due diligence liability²analysing variation in 
legislative design, stringency, and hybridity.  Our analysis of the legislation was based on the 
scope of the Acts, the duties that they impose on companies, the sanctions that follow from 
noncompliance with these duties, and the jurisdictional scope. Comparing the Acts across 
these criteria sheds light into how they differ.  These differences are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 goes about here 
 
 While much of the Modern Slavery Act focuses on harmonizing existing domestic 
governance related to the use of forced labor within the UK, it contains a transparency clause 
that is designed to strengthen corporate governance for labor conditions overseas. Companies 
that are subject to the duty must make µa statement of the steps the organisation has taken 
during the financial year to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place in 
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any of its supply chains, and any part of its own business, or a statement that the organisation 
has taken no such steps¶ (Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 54(4)). 
 The Act therefore leaves companies discretion not to deal with forced labor or slavery 
in their supply chains at all, since companies can be compliant with the law without taking 
any steps to prevent or address forced labor, so long as they publish a statement. Moreover, 
whilst the section lists a number of LVVXHVWKDWWKHVWDWHPHQWµPD\LQFOXGHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW¶
including its policies in relation to slavery and human trafficking, it is not compulsory for 
companies to report on these issues (Home Office, 2015). In legal terms, the Modern Slavery 
Act amounts to little more than an endorsement of existing voluntary CSR reporting without 
any legally binding standards, and there are no government sanctions for failure to combat 
modern slavery or failure to report about the FRPSDQ\¶VSROLFLHV.   
 Rather than imposing new standards onto companies, or requiring companies to 
report on a standardized set of indicators, transparency legislation seeks to encourage 
companies to strengthen the private governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct and 
auditing and their commercial power to transform supplier behaviour. It has a high degree of 
hybridity, insofar as it reinforces private governance tools rather than creating new public 
standards or enforcement mechanisms.  It has a low level of stringency, insofar as LWGRHVQ¶W
require companies to improve standards, nor impose penalties for noncompliance. Rather, the 
theory behind transparency legislation is that UK companies can use their economic leverage 
to positively affect working conditions throughout global supply chains, and requiring them to 
disclose their effort to tackle forced labor will spur them on to do so because consumers and 
investors can use the information disclosed to guide their purchasing decisions, and thus 
punish laggards. In short, this model of home state regulation seeks to use public regulation to 
µOHYHUDJH¶SULYDWHJRYHUQDQFHIRUSXEOLFSXUSRVHV (Mayer 2014). 
  The Bribery Act takes a different approach, establishing extraterritorial corporate 
criminal liability for bribery that occurs within D FRPSDQ\¶V JOREDO VXSSO\ FKDLQ. A 
commercial organisation is guilty of an offence if a person associated with it bribes another 
person with the intention of benefitting the commercial organisation (Bribery Act 2010, s7 
(1)). The Act also contains a defence to this offence for companies if they can prove that they 
had in place µadequate procedures¶ZKLFKDUHGHVLJQHG WRSUHYHQWDQ\RQHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK LW
from committing bribery (Bribery Act, s7 (2)).   
 7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V guidance on the Act contains two points that are particularly 
important for our analysis (Ministry of Justice, 2011). First, it defines that contractors could 
EHµDVVRFLDWHG¶SHUVRQV WR WKHH[WHQW WKDW they are performing services for or on behalf of a 
12 
 
commercial organisation. The guidance then refers to the example of a supply chain with 
subcontractors. It recommends to companies that the principal way to address bribery in such 
a chain would be to employ anti-bribery procedures with their direct suppliers and to require 
these suppliers to request the same from their sub suppliers. Secondly, among the principles 
WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWRXWOLQHVLQLWVJXLGDQFHDVµDGHTXDWHSURFHGXUHV¶ZKLFKZRXOGFRQVWLWXWH
DGHIHQFHDJDLQVWFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\DUHµGXHGLOLJHQFH¶PHFKDQLVPV 
 In comparison to transparency legislation, the Bribery Act constitutes a more 
stringent form of public governance. Whereas the transparency legislation is intended to 
create a minimum level playing field in the sense that at least all companies are expected to 
address the issue in one way or another DQGWKHQOHWWKHPDUNHWGHFLGHDERXWKRZµJRRG¶WKRVH
policies are, the Bribery Act places a compulsory demand on companies to address bribery in 
their supply chains. Companies must have adequate procedures (particularly due diligence 
mechanisms) in place if they want to avoid the danger of being criminally liable. That way, 
the Act indirectly imposes on companies due diligence on the CSR issue of bribery. Whereas, 
RQ WKHEDVLVRI WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VJXLGDQFHRQ WKH%ULEHU\$FW LW LV WREHH[SHFWHG WKDW8.
multinational enterprises will be unlikely to be liable for bribery committed by the 
subcontractors of their direct suppliers, i.e. tier 2 or tier 3 suppliers, the expectation is that 
companies introduce due diligence mechanisms into their supply chain and that those policies 
would then be passed on further down the chain in order to avoid any danger of liability.   
 In short, although both pieces of legislation are examples of home state regulation to 
strengthen CSR in global supply chains, they vary in their design, stringency, and hybridity. 
In the Bribery Act model, criminal liability coupled with the defence of due diligence 
constitutes a much more stringent form of public governance than the transparency clause in 
the Modern Slavery Act.  
 
4. Exploring the differential impact of UK legislation on bribery and modern slavery 
4.1 Research approach 
In the remainder of the paper, we analyse the impact of the Bribery Act and Modern 
Slavery Act on company strategy *XLGHG E\ (EHUOHLQ HW DO¶V  LQVLJKW WKDW WKHUH LV D
need to use meso-OHYHO DQDO\VLV RI JRYHUQDQFH LQWHUDFWLRQV WR µH[DPLQH LQWHUDFWLRQV DPRQJ
VFKHPHV WKDW DGGUHVVGLIIHUHQW LVVXHVZLWKLQ D VLQJOH VHFWRU¶  ZH examine how financial 
and labor issues are dealt with in recent UK public legislation and how the two Acts have 
GLIIHUHQWLDOO\µVWHHUHG¶company policies.  Rather than focusing on companies within a single 
sector, we have focused on 25 FTSE100 companies (that were FTSE100 constituents in May 
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2016) that operate internationally and have overseas suppliers (for a list, see Appendix A). 
We selected companies that: 1) had an international supplier base (creating a risk of forced 
labor and bribery within their global supply chain); 2) had a sufficient number of publicly 
available documents; 3) we determined to be covered under both Acts; 4) represented key 
industries, as detailed below. Because previous studies of CSR have established that larger 
companies are more likely to implement globally focused private governance solutions, and 
have greater resources to adapt practices and policies to new regulation, we also sought to 
select companies that were as close to the same size as possible. This purposive sampling 
approach was more appropriate than random selection given the substantive proportion of 
FTSE100 companies that did not meet these criteria. 
We focused our study on twenty-five of the largest UK companies for two reasons. 
First, this allowed us to incorporate a range of firms across the three economic sectors 
(primary, secondary, and tertiary), and within those, to achieve coverage of the main 
industries represented by UK FTSE100 companies: mining, energy, agriculture, retail and 
consumer goods, defence and automobiles, pharmaceuticals, hotels and airlines, outsourcing, 
communications, and financial services (see Table 3). This allowed us to cut across sectorial 
patterns to focus on how different types of companies dealt with the issues of bribery and 
forced labor.  Second, because (as described in the Introduction) our research was of a 
µSUREDELOLW\SUREH¶QDWXUHZHFRQVLGHUHGWKLVWREHDUHDVRQDEOHsample to shed light into our 
research question about whether and how variation in home state design might differentially 
be µVWHHUing¶ FRUSRUDWH EHKDYLRXU DQG WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU RU QRW WKHUH DUH UHOHYDQW
discernable patterns worthy of larger-scale research.  
 
Table 3 goes about here 
 
We explored our research questions through documentary analysis, which was 
advantageous because it allowed us to reliably assess similarities and differences across a 
larger set of companies than we would have been able to do through other qualitative 
methods. In particular, we analysed how the Acts have shaped the behaviour of UK-based 
companies, and especially their sourcing practices, policies, and contracts.  For each 
FRPSDQ\ZHDQDO\VHGWKHFRPSDQ\¶V2ZQFRGHRIFRQGXFW6XSSOLHUFRGHRIFRQGXFW
3) Terms and conditions of purchase for suppliers; 4) CSR/sustainability reports for 2015 and 
2016; 5) Any other information on the website or further policies such as specific 
bribery/forced labor policies since 2010. iii We retrieved these company documents in May 
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IURPHDFKFRPSDQ\¶VZHEVLWHDQGZKHUHPXOWLSOHYHUVLRQVZHUHDYDLODEOHZHXVHGthe 
most recent version. The dates of the documents we studied varied (as there is no standard 
timeline for companies to refresh codes of conduct), but crucially, because we gathered these 
documents one year after the enactment of the Modern Slavery Act, all companies analysed 
were aware of this legislation and their obligation to report under it, and had sufficient time to 
adjust their contracts and policies to new legislative expectations. 
We supplemented our study of twenty-five companies by investigating a single 
company in greater depth. We selected Vodafone as a single company case study because of 
the availability of data on the evolution of their CSR policies across both issue areas over the 
time period we were interested in (2009-2016).iv  Zooming in allowed us to gain insights into 
KRZDFRPSDQ\¶VSUDFWLFHVHYROYHGRYHUWLPH)RUWKLVFRPSRQHQWRIWKHVWXG\ZHH[DPLQHG
additional supplementary documentation, including recent interviews about CSR policy with 
company executives and lawyers. Evaluating these documents allowed us to gain a broader 
and clearer sense of how company policy evolved over time, and to pinpoint the influence of 
the Acts in shaping changes in corporate policy.   
Our approach has disadvantages, which primarily relate to the challenge of 
documenting changes in company practice over time. Since most companies only make the 
most recent copy of their Code of Conduct and Supplier Code of Conduct available, it is 
difficult to conclusively establish the impact of each piece of legislation on company 
practices; a challenge we sought to circumvent by analysing what companies said about the 
legislation in their CSR and annual reports. Guided by the recognition that companies do 
adapt their policies and practices in response to legislation, and assuming that one year after 
the passing of the Modern Slavery Act is an adequate period of time within which to do so, 
our analysis of company documentation provides a snapshot of the weight and seriousness 
that companies afford to the issues of bribery and forced labor within their global supply 
chains at the time of our study.  We initially had hoped to include a comparative component 
within our study, contrasting UK companies against similar companies from outside the UK 
not covered by the Acts, to isolate the influence of the UK legislation. However, as both the 
%ULEHU\$FWDQGWKH0RGHUQ6ODYHU\$FWFRYHUIRUHLJQFRPSDQLHVWKDWµFDUU\RQDEXVLQHVVRU
D SDUW RI D EXVLQHVV LQ DQ\ SDUW RI WKH 8.¶ WKH ELJJHVW FRPSDQLHV LQ PRVW RWKHU PDMRU
jurisdictions such as Germany and the US KDYHDGRSWHGSROLFLHVLQUHVSRQVHWRWKH8.¶VODZV
as these companies usually also operate in the UK.  
Because of these challenges in obtaining comparative and baseline data, our analysis 
was guided by a theoretically predicted outcome, namely, what we thought policy-makers 
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sought to achieve through each of the two Acts.  The aims of each Act have been clearly 
articulated by policy-makers.  We assume that through the Modern Slavery Act, policy-
makers sought to spur companies to address and prevent modern slavery within their 
operations and supply chains. 7KLV DVVXPSWLRQ LV FRQILUPHG E\ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V VWDWXtory 
JXLGDQFH RQ WKH $FW ZKLFK VWDWHV µ7KH 7UDQVSDUHQF\ LQ 6XSSO\ &KDLQV SURYLVLRQ LQ WKH
Modern Slavery Act seeks to address the role of businesses in preventing modern slavery 
IURP RFFXUULQJ LQ WKHLU VXSSO\ FKDLQV DQG RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ 8. +RPH 2IILFH 15: 3). We 
assume that through the Bribery Act, policy-makers sought to spur companies to address and 
prevent bribery within their operations and supply chains. This assumption is confirmed by 
WKHIRUHZRUGWRWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VVWDWXWRU\JXLGDQFHZKLFKVWDWHs, µ%ULEHU\ blights lives. Its 
immediate victims include firms that lose out unfairly... At stake is the principle of free and 
fair competition, which stands diminished by each bribe offered or accepted¶8.0LQLVWU\RI
Justice, 2011: 2). 
 
4.2 The µEULEHU\HIIHFW¶ 
Table 4 summarizes our key findings.  As it describes, we found major differences between 
company strategies on bribery and forced labor, including differences in how each issue was 
framed and dealt with in policy and codes of conduct, and in relation to the quality and 
quantity of company reporting on their strategy in relation to each issue.  All of the companies 
included in our study: a) proactively engaged with the issue of bribery in their policies and 
private contracts with suppliers or published a bribery policy or mentioned bribery due 
diligence on their websites; and b) used stricter language in relation to bribery compared to 
forced labor. In addition, most companies (92%) had stricter requirements on bribery than 
forced labor in their code of conduct or other supplier-related documents, and a high 
proportion (80%) had more frequent and higher quality reporting about bribery than forced 
labor within their company CSR/sustainability report.   
 
Table 4 goes about here 
 
 Overall, it appears that the Bribery Act has achieved traction towards its aim of 
µVWHHULQJ¶FRPSDQ\EHKDYLRXU$VZHGHWDLOEHORZFRPSDQLHVKDGFOHDUDQGVWULFWSROLFLHVRQ
bribery, which they communicated to suppliers.  The Modern Slavery Act, by contrast, 
appears to have done little to achieve its intended impact on corporate behaviour. Company 
policies rarely gave a prominent role to forced labor, and where it was mentioned, companies 
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made vague and aspirational claims about their commitments to addressing it within global 
supply chains. Three key trends are especially important.  First, bribery appears to have 
become a genuine compliance issue, as evidenced by the central role it is given within legal 
buyer-supplier documents such as in the Terms and Conditions of Purchase for Suppliers and 
the supplier codes of conduct. Secondly, companies use much more stringent language when 
they refer to the use of EULEHU\ HJ µ]HUR WROHUDQFH¶ WKDQ IRUFHG ODERr HJ µZH VHHN WR
LPSURYH¶. Thirdly, bribery is given a much more prominent role within company reporting, 
compared to the issue of modern slavery or human trafficking, both in term of the quantity 
and the quality of reporting. In summary, our documentary analysis suggests DµEULEHU\HIIHFW¶
in global supply chain governance, wherein home state legislation that establishes criminal 
corporate liability and imposes due diligence requirements on companies has spurred deeper 
changes to corporate practices than transparency legislation.  
 
4.3 Bribery as a compliance issue 
As described in Table 4, we found that in contractual documents (i.e. the Terms and 
Conditions of Purchase and the Supplier Codes of Conduct), bribery was afforded much 
higher standing than forced labor. These documents evidence that bribery has become a 
genuine compliance issue that companies are addressing through due diligence mechanisms.  
 $ JRRG H[DPSOH LV *OD[R6PLWK.OLQH¶V (GSK) Terms and Conditions of Purchase 
(T&Cs) 8QGHU WKH KHDGLQJ µ(WKLFDO 6WDQGDUGV Dnd +XPDQ 5LJKWV¶ $UWLFOH  RI *6.¶V 
T&Cs refer to a range of issues that a supplier must comply with, and includes a strict clause 
prohibiting forced labor, stating a sXSSOLHUPXVWZDUUDQWWKDWµLWGRHVQot use forced labor in 
DQ\ IRUP¶ :KLOVW WKH Zording of this clause is clear, it is meager in comparison to how 
*6.¶V7	&VGHDOZLWKWKHLVVXHRIbribery. The T&Cs contain a clause that refers to Annex 
A (suppliers are required WR FRPSO\ µZLWK WKH *6. $QWL-Bribery and Corruption 
Requirements set out iQ$QQH[$¶) (GSK Terms and Conditions of Purchase, s21.1.9). Annex 
$ HQWLWOHG µ*6. $17, %5,%(5< $1' &255837,21 5(48,5(0(176¶ FRQWDLQV D
detailed outline of what GSK expects from its suppliers in terms of compliance with anti-
corruption laws through three specific clauses. The Annex also contains a glossary of words 
related to bribery. Although GSK has a stricter prohibition of forced labor as compared to 
many other companies, there is an important difference in legal status between the clauses on 
forced labor and bribery. The principles about bribery are more detailed, refer to compliance 
with laws and, above all, also refer to the ways that third parties such as suppliers who act for 
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GSK must ensure that there is no bribery in their dealings with other third parties. The level of 
detail that GSK applies to the requirements clearly constitute due diligence mechanisms.  
 A further interesting comparison suggesting that bribery has become a genuine 
compliance issue, while forced labor has not, regards the respective significance attached to 
these issues within their codes of conduct. Codes of conduct are usually incorporated into the 
supply FRQWUDFWVEHWZHHQEX\HUVDQGVXSSOLHUV WKURXJKDUHIHUHQFH LQ WKHEX\HU¶V WHUPVDQG
conditions which gives them contractual quality (Rühmkorf, 2015). For example, Imperial 
Brands distinguishes between the two issues in in its code of conduct in the following way: 
WKHFRGHVWLSXODWHVWKDWµFompliance with bribery and corruption laws is compulsory. We must 
not offer«¶whereas it includes forced labor in a much more vague and aspirational wayµ:H
must promote and protect human rights and ensure we do not directly or indirectly contribute 
WRDQ\KXPDQULJKWVDEXVHV«:H PXVWZRUNZLWKRXUVXSSOLHUV«Wo encourage and support 
their implementation of minimum age/forced laboU VWDQGDUGV¶ Imperial Tobacco ((now 
Imperial Brands)) Code of Conduct). Significantly, Imperial Brands has been extensively 
criticised for the existence of forced labor in its supply chain (Rodionova, 2016). The relative 
weight given to bribery over forced labor within contractual documents is thus especially 
surprising.   
 
4.4 7KHODQJXDJHRIµDQWL-EULEHU\¶DQGµ]HURWROHUDQFH¶YVµZHVHHNWRLPSURYH¶ 
Relatedly, we found that the language that companies use to communicate governance 
standards and practices related to bribery and forced labor also differs significantly. Whilst 
there is a strict wording in relation to bribery, and frequent references are made to legal and 
commercial consequences for non-compliance, only aspirational language was typically used 
for forced labor.  
 Within company documents, bULEHU\ LV XVXDOO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV SDUW RI µDQWL-bribery 
SROLFLHV¶  Companies outlined their µ]HUR WROHUDQFH¶ IRU bribery and hasten to mention that 
WKH\ µFRPSO\ ZLWK EULEHU\ ODZV¶ DQG WKDW µFRPSOLDQFH ZLWK EULEHU\ DQG FRUUXption laws is 
FRPSXOVRU\¶6RPHGRFXPHQWVHYHQPHQWLRQWKHGDQJHUWKDWWKHPXOWLQDWLRQDOHQWHUSULVHVWKDW
we looked at in our study will be µFULPLQDOO\ OLDEOH¶ LI OLQNHG WR EULEHU\ 7KH language 
communicating forced labor policies within codes of conduct is much more aspirational. 
5DWKHUWKDQµ]HURWROHUDQFH¶FRPSDQLHVXVHYDJXHODQJXDJHWRGHVFUibe their stance on forced 
labor, using language VXFKDV µZHVHHN WR«¶)RU instance, the BP Code of Conduct states: 
µ:HVHHNWRFRQGXFWRXUEXVLQHVV LQDPDQQHUWKDWUHVSHFWV WKHKXPDQULJKWVDQGGLJQLW\RI
people. Each of us can play a role in the elimination of human rights abuses such as child 
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labor, human trafficking and forced laboU¶ 7KH VDPH BP code addresses bribery in the 
IROORZLQJZD\µ:HGRQRt WROHUDWH«:HFRPSO\ZLWK«¶Assessment of statements issued 
under the Modern Slavery Act reveal that these documents, too, seldom go beyond 
aspirations. For example, labor law consulting firm Ergon FRQFOXGHVWKDWµPRVWVWDWHPHQWVGR
QRWJRIXUWKHUWKDQJHQHUDOFRPPLWPHQWVDQGEURDGLQGLFDWLRQVRISURFHVVHV¶ (Ergon, 2016). 
 The differences in company language surrounding bribery and forced labor send a 
clear message that while companies will not tolerate bribery in any form at any time within 
their global supply chains, they merely hope to eliminate forced labor.  
 
4.5 Higher quantity and better quality of reporting 
Finally, we found that bribery is afforded a much more prominent role in company CSR and 
sustainability reporting. It is also more frequently specifically referenced in the other 
documents that we looked at (eg. codes of conduct).  )RULQVWDQFH,PSHULDO%UDQGV¶FRGHRI
conduct mentions bribery 12 times (starting as early as in Section 1, µ%XVLQHVV,QWHJULW\¶and 
Section 4, µ$QWL-%ULEHU\DQG&RUUXSWLRQ¶. Forced labor is only addressed once, on page 57 
RXWRI6LPLODUO\9RGDIRQH¶V6XVWDLQDELOLW\ UHSRUWPHQWLRQV WKHZRUGµEULEHU\¶ WLPHV
excluding its use in titles (there are 40 usages of bribery including titles), whereas it only 
UHIHUVWRµIRUFHGODERU¶WKUHH times, including one mention within a chart. 
 In addition to receiving frequent mention, company reporting on bribery was also of 
a higher quality. While most company CSR and sustainability reports included dedicated 
VHFWLRQV WREULEHU\ FRPPRQO\ HQWLWOHG µ$QWL-%ULEHU\ &RUUXSWLRQ¶ IRUFHG labor was almost 
always collapsed alongside several other social and laboULVVXHVXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJRIµKXPDQ
ULJKWV¶7KLVZDVWUXHHYHQRIFRPSDQLHVLQVHFWRUVGRFXPHQWHGWRKDYHKLJKULVNs of forced 
labor, such as tobacco.  
 The strong priority given to bribery within private governance instruments 
communicates to suppliers that companies are serious about this issue. Contrarily, the low 
priority given to forced labor signals to suppliers that companies are not serious about this 
issue.  We observed a clear hierarchy between the bribery and forced labor in terms of 
contractual stringency, the language that is being used and the quantity and quality of 
reporting. Bribery clearly is a compliance issue for companies which they address through 
due diligence mechanisms whereas forced labor is² despite also being illegal in most 
countries, and despite being a gross human rights violation² dealt with in a more 
aspirational, less stringent way.  
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4.6 9RGDIRQH¶VDSSURDFK to bribery and forced labor since 2009 
Our closer look at Vodafone provides interesting additional insight into the differences in 
corporate strategy in relation to bribery and forced labor and how their strategy has evolved 
and been influenced by the Acts over time. Whereas prior to the introduction of the Bribery 
Act, Vodafone¶V&65UHSRUWV in 2009 and 2010 did not mention bribery at all, the situation 
changed when the Bribery Act came into force in July 2011. The report in that year was 
SXEOLVKHGEHIRUHWKH$FWFDPHLQWRIRUFHEXWLWDOUHDG\VWDWHGWKDWµIn anticipation of the UK 
Bribery Act, due to come into force in July 2011, we have also reviewed and reinforced our 
anti-bribery programme with training to be rolled out across WKH *URXS¶ 7KH  UHSRUW
UHIHUV WR EULEHU\  WLPHV ,Q 9RGDIRQH¶V VXEVHTXHQW CSR/sustainability reports, bribery 
became an increasingly prominent topic. Whilst the 2012 was not available, the 2013 report 
mentions bribery 19 times excluding titles (and 20 times including titles) and, in 2014, this 
figure rose further, as bribery was mentioned 28 times (29 times including titles). The 2015 
report refers to bribery 34 times (40 times including titles) and the latest report in 2016 
mentions it 41 times (43 with titles). 
 Moreover, it is important to note that the 2013 report outlines VoGDIRQH¶V µglobal 
anti-bribery programme¶LQDVHSDUDWHVHFWLRQZKLFKLQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VZRUGVµis aligned with 
the six principles of the UK Bribery Act guidance¶ ,PSRUWDQWO\ IRU WKH DQDO\VLV KHUH WKLV
programme includes due diligence mechanisms. It therefore appears that the introduction of 
WKH%ULEHU\$FWSURPSWHGVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHVLQ9RGDIRQH¶V&65HIIRUWVWRSUHYHQWEULEHU\LQ
its supply chain. This argument is further supported by the statement of Rosemary Martin, the 
FRPSDQ\¶Vgeneral legal counsel, that she established a formal compliance team after she took 
RYHUKHU UROH LQ$SULO0DUWLQ VD\V µ:H¶GDOUHDG\GRQHTXLWH a lot in the compliance 
area, but it was all kickstarted after the introduction of the %ULEHU\$FW LQ WKH8. LQ¶
(The Lawyer, 2012). Her comments further support the view that the design of the Bribery 
Act steered corporate behaviour in a way that companies developed compliance mechanisms 
for the prevention of bribery. 
 In the meantime, the approach to forced laboULQ9RGDIRQH¶VUHSRUWVEHWZHHQ
and 2016 was relatively steady. From 2009 to 2011, forced labor was only mentioned once in 
a chart that contained information about performance issues that Vodafone had identified at 
supplier factories. Whilst the CSR/sustainability reports after the introduction of the Bribery 
Act saw a sharp increase in the quantity and quality of disclosure about bribery, the way that 
forced labor was addressed remained low-key with only 5 references (three of them in the 
chart mentioned above) in 2013, 4 references (including one in a chart) in 2014 and in 2015, 
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the year the Modern Slavery Act was passed, that number went down to 3 references 
(including one in a chart). Following the coming into force of the Act, the number of 
references increased to 10 in the 2016 report; however, in reality, there were again only 3 
references in the text of the sustainability report and 1 in a chart and the other 6 were part of 
the statutory slavery and human trafficking statement which Vodafone added to its annual 
sustainability report. Therefore, the reporting has not been significantly altered in the wake of 
the new legislative environment.  
 Moreover, the policies that the company applies to the two issues according to its 
UHSRUWFRQWLQXHWRGLIIHULQWKHLUVWULQJHQF\:KLOVW9RGDIRQHSURKLELWVVXSSOLHUVWRµuse 
any form of forced, bonded, compulsory labor, slavery or human WUDIILFNLQJ¶ LQ LWV&RGHRI
Ethical Purchasing, this requirement does not constitute much more than what was already 
found in similar codes prior to the Modern Slavery Act. However, in relation to bribery, the 
company applies a µJOobal anti-EULEHU\ SURJUDPPH¶ ,Q LWV  VXVWDLQDELOLW\ UHSRUW
Vodafone outlines on two pages its µ*RYHUQDQFH DQG ULVN DVVHVVPHQW¶ UHODWHG WR EULEHU\
(Vodafone 2016, pp. 47-48). In contrast, the description of the risks of forced labor and 
9RGDIRQH¶VUHVSRQVHVWRWKRVHULVNVDPRXQWWROHVVWKDQKDOIDSDJH9RGDIRQHS 
 In summary, the analysis of the documents of Vodafone as a case study of one 
company adds further support to the view taken here that the way that companies are dealing 
with the issues of bribery and forced labor differs markedly and that the regulation of bribery 
has spurred more substantive changes in corporate behaviour. 
 
5. Conclusion  
We have argued in this paper that home state regulations varies in terms of its stringency and 
the form and degree of public-private interactions, and that variation in the quality of home 
state regulation carries important consequences in terms of effectiveness at steering company 
policies and practices within global supply chains.  While public labor standards regulation is 
RIWHQ DVVXPHG WR EH D FRKHUHQW ERG\ RI µKDUG ODZ¶ an accelerating wave of recent public 
regulation to spur CSR for labor standards merely codifies and legitimates existing private 
governance mechanisms. This raises critical questions about the significant differences occur 
in the quality of national legislation, and especially, the politics of bargaining processes that 
underpin their formation. 
 As mentioned, the UK government initially considered modelling the Modern 
Slavery Act after the Bribery Act, however the policymaking process changed course 
following the emergence of private regulatory options and activities, and as societal and 
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industry forces coalesced to endorse transparency legislation (LeBaron and Rühmkorf, 
unpublished) 7KH 0RGHUQ 6ODYHU\ $FW¶V ORZ VWULQJHQF\ DQG KLJK K\EULGLW\ therefore 
resulted² at least in part² IURP LQGXVWU\ DQG VRPHSROLWLFLDQV¶RSSRVLWLRQ WRSURSRVDOV WR
create extraterritorial criminal liability (with indirectly imposed due diligence requirements) 
for forced labor within global supply chains.  
 That the Modern Slavery Act fails to establish new public labor standards or 
enforcement mechanisms is significant, given the differences we observe between company 
policies and practices on bribery and forced labor. While stringent legislation appears to 
strengthen private governance, such as by spurring lead firms to use their contractual 
bargaining power and implementation of due-diligence based procedures, less stringent 
legislation does not appear to spur change in company practices. This variation is 
understandable, given that the Bribery Act model provides an incentive for companies to 
avoid sanctions by implementing adequate due diligence procedures, while the Modern 
Slavery Act does not impose additional requirements (except in regards to reporting) and 
carries no sanction for non-compliance.  Within the Modern Slavery Act, the substitution of a 
vague reporting requirement over a more stringent model of public governance appears to 
KDYHXQGHUPLQHGLWVHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQµVWHHULQJ¶FRUSRUDWHEHKDYLRUAlthough it is possible that 
company strategy could still evolve, we are skeptical that this legislation will result in 
meaningful changes to company and supplier policies on forced labor, given the shortcomings 
we have documented in its institutional design. 
 While it has become commonplace to argue that public and private labor governance 
PHFKDQLVPV FDQ EH FRPSOLPHQWDU\ DQG WKDW µSXEOLF DQG SULYDWH UHJXODWRU\ HIIRUWV QHHG WR
ZRUN ZLWK DQG EXLOG RII RQ RQH DQRWKHU¶ (Locke, 2013: 177), our study highlights the 
possibility that the integration of private governance into public legislation can undermine and 
weaken effectiveness. There is a need for further study of this phenomenon, not only in home 
state legislation, but in relation to public governance of labor standards more generally.  
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Notes 
                                                          
i
 We thank the Editors of this special issue for this phrasing.   
ii
 A tort is a civil wrong that is committed against an individual and which unfairly causes someone else to suffer 
loss or harm, for example, an injury due to negligence. The person who commits the tortious act is liable to the 
tort victim, who can recover damages for the loss or harm. For a general introduction to the law of tort, see 
Cooke (2013).  
iii
 Occasionally, one or more of these documents was unavailable online, so we sought to obtain them through 
emails and phone calls to companies. Where these efforts did not yield additional documentation, we were 
forced to omit the missing document for that company. 
iv
 Consistent year-on-year reporting across a consistent set of issue areas was not commonplace for the 
companies included in our study. Vodafone¶VZHEVLWH provides detail on their ethical policies and actions across 
a range of issue areas for a multi-year period.  For instance, they provide consistent data on different types of 
fraud that resulted in dismissal for each year since 2011 and due diligence in relation to conflicts minerals since 
2013. 
